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Abstract
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker
communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages
and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader
can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e.,
if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base
problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies
that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the
information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel.
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1 Introduction
In modern internet societies, pieces of information are repeatedly and continuously disclosed
to decision makers by informed agents. Information transmission is affected by at least two
sources of friction. First, the sender and the receiver of a given message may have nonaligned
incentives, in which case the sender might be unwilling to transmit truthful information. Sec-
ond, communication between agents is often imperfect. The sender and the receiver may have
time constraints to write or read messages, forcing the sender to summarize his arguments and
making him unable to convey all the details. Further, there might be discrepancies between the
informational content of a message that is intended by the sender and the one understood by
the receiver. For instance, if the mother tongue of the sender and of the receiver are different,
there are possible translation errors (See Blume, Board, and Kawamura, 2007). Additionally,
messages travelling in a network of computers might be subject to random shocks, internal errors
or protocol failures. Studying the effect of noise in communication channels is the starting point
of information theory (Shannon, 1948).
Our paper aims to study the following questions. How does imperfect communication reduce
the possibilities of persuasion in a sender-receiver interaction? When the sender communicates
many pieces of information, to what extent does tying the pieces together help in overcoming
the communication limitations?
We consider a sender and a receiver who communicate over an imperfect channel and are
engaged in a series of n ≥ 1 persuasion problems. The sender observes n independent and
identically distributed pieces of information and sends k ≥ 1 messages to the receiver. Messages
are sent through a channel that consists of two finite sets X,Y of respectively inputs and outputs
messages and of a transition probability Q from X to Y such that when the sender chooses input
message x, the receiver receives output message y with probability Q(y|x). Upon receiving k
output messages from the channel, the receiver chooses n actions, one for each problem. Payoffs
are additively separable across persuasion problems. We assume that the sender is able to commit
to a disclosure strategy that maps sequences of pieces of information to distributions of sequences
of input messages.
We study the optimal average payoff secured by the sender by committing to a strategy. We
give an upper bound on this optimal payoff and show that this bound is achieved asymptotically
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when the numbers n and k grow large. To prove this latter statement, we borrow techniques from
information theory, namely, the coding and decoding schemes of Shannon (1948, 1959). This
machinery allows to transmit a sequence of messages over a noisy channel with the property that
the receiver recovers almost all messages correctly. The information theoretic literature typically
considers an obedient receiver who calculates the decoded messages and takes them at face value.
In the persuasion game framework, the receiver is strategic and may not follow any prescribed
scheme. Rather, the receiver takes into account the strategy of the sender and the received
outputs, calculates its Bayesian belief about the sequence of states, and chooses a sequence of
actions that maximizes its payoff. Our technical contribution is to construct a strategy of the
sender for which we are able to estimate and to control those Bayesian beliefs in order to ensure
that the strategic receiver chooses a desired sequence of actions.
Our upper bound is the value of an optimal splitting problem with information constraint,
which represents the best payoff that the sender can achieve by sending a message, subject to
the constraint that the mutual information between the state and the message is no more than
the capacity of the channel. We show that this value is given by the concave closure of the
payoff function of the sender, subject to a constraint on the entropy of posterior beliefs. This
is also given by the concave closure of a modified payoff function, where the sender pays a cost
proportional to the mutual information between the state and the message.
1.1 Motivating example.
There are relevant situations where a sender discloses information about a large number of
independent state parameters. For instance, one can think of testing product quality: a firm has
many items to sell, which are ex-ante identical, and the authorities (e.g., the FDA for drugs)
design quality tests 1. One can also think about designing and grading exams to assess the
quality of a large number of students2.
As an example, consider an innovating firm that has several projects to be financed by
investors. The board of investors audits the firm, which is given a limited amount of time to
present all the projects. How to best structure arguments in order to get the maximum number
of projects approved?
To be specific, let us assume that all projects are ex-ante identical and equally likely to be
1See e.g., Perez and Skreta, 2018.
2See Boleslavsky and Cotton, 2015 for a model of grading standards through Bayesian persuasion.
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of good or bad quality. When a project is approved, it yields a positive return of +1 to the
investors if it is good, and a negative return of −7 if it is bad; rejecting a project yields a payoff
of 0. The objective of the firm is to get a maximum number of projects approved.
Suppose that the firm commits to an information disclosure mechanism, i.e., distributions of
messages conditional on states (as in Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and faces no restriction on
the number of messages. To invest, the board of investors must be persuaded that the project
is good with probability at least 7/8. Thus, for each project, the firm would optimally draw a
good message g or a bad message b with the following probabilities:
P(g | project is good) = 1, P(g | project is bad) = 1/7.
This way, the belief that the project is good upon receiving the good message is as follows:
P(project is good | g) = 7/8,
and the project is accepted with probability 4/7 (see Section 4).
Now, suppose that the auditing board gives the firm only half the time it would require to
talk about all projects. Namely, there is an even number n of projects, but the firm has only
n/2 messages available.
A simple strategy the firm can adopt would be to select half of the projects, focus on them,
and communicate optimally for each of them. With this strategy, half of the projects are accepted
with probability 4/7 each, so in expectation, the average number of accepted projects is 2/7.
This is not optimal, and a better strategy would be to pair projects by two and to draw one
message g, b for each pair in the following way:
P(g | both projects are good) = 1, P(g | both projects are bad) = 0,
P(g | only one project is good) = 1/6.
The total probability of g is 1/3 and upon observing this message, the beliefs about quality are
as follows:
P(both projects are good | g) = 6/8,
P(only project 1 is good | g) = P(only project 2 is good | g) = 1/8.
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Therefore, each project is believed to be good with probability 7/8 and both projects are accepted
when g is received. Thus, the expected average number of accepted projects is 1/3 > 2/7.
We thus see that tying projects together improves upon communication about each project
separately. Suppose that the number of projects is large. Is it possible to find a more complex
strategy that further improves the payoff?
Our main result, Theorem 3.1, gives an upper bound on the expected average number of
accepted projects when the number of messages is half the number of projects. The upper
bound is tight: the optimal value approaches it as the number of project increases. In this
example, the upper bound is λ∗ where (λ∗, p∗) is the unique solution in [0, 1] × [0, 12 ] of the
system of equations:
1
2
= λ∗
7
8
+ (1− λ∗)p∗,
1
2
= λ∗H
(
7
8
)
+ (1− λ∗)H(p∗),
where H(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p) is the entropy function. The first equation is Bayes
plausibility (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) coming from Bayes’ rule, saying that the expected
posterior belief is the prior belief. The second equation requires the expected entropy of the
posterior to be 12 , which means that the mutual information between the quality of the project
and the message sent to the receiver is equal to the number of messages per project that the firm
is able to transmit.
Numerically λ∗ ≈ 0.519 < 47 ≈ 0.571. Thus, for large n, the sender can achieve a payoff
better than 1/3 but bounded away from the payoff obtained with unrestricted communication.
1.2 Related literature
We now describe the relationships between our contribution and the literature. This paper
is at the junction of Bayesian persuasion and information theory.
The traditional game theoretic approach to strategic information disclosure assumes perfect
communication and analyzes in isolation the problem of sending a single message. These are
the well-known sender-receiver games where an informed player, the sender, communicates once
with a receiver who takes an action. In the cheap talk version of this game, the message sent
by the sender is costless and unverifiable; see for instance the seminal paper of Crawford and
Sobel (1982). In the Bayesian persuasion game (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), the sender
chooses verifiably an information disclosure device prior to learning his information. That is,
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the sender is an information designer (Bergemann and Morris, 2016, 2017; Taneva, 2018) who
chooses, without knowledge of the state, the information or signaling structure which releases
information to the decision maker.
In parallel, information theory considers agents with perfectly aligned interests and ana-
lyzes the rate of information transmission. The sender observes an information flow, which is
a stochastic process, and sends messages to the receiver over an imperfect channel represented
by a transition probability from input to output messages. Truthful information transmission
is the common goal of the sender and the receiver. The rate of information transmission is the
average number of correct guesses made by the receiver. Shannon’s theory (Shannon, 1948, 1959)
determines whether a source of information can be transmitted over the channel with arbitrarily
small probability of error and shows that the rate of the source of information has to be smaller
than the capacity of the channel defined as the maximal mutual information between input and
output messages.
Our model of persuasion has two essential features. The sender and the receiver are engaged
in a large number of identical copies of the same game and communication is restricted to an
imperfect channel. As Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we consider the payoff obtained by the
sender as a function of the belief of the receiver, when the receiver takes optimal actions. With
unrestricted communication, that is on a perfect channel with large set of inputs, the optimal
payoff for the sender is given by the concave closure of this function. Then, solving any number
of identical games amounts to solving each copy separately. With a single copy, the game of
persuasion with a noisy channel is studied by Tsakas and Tsakas (2018) who prove the existence
of optimal solutions and show monotonicity of the sender’s payoff with respect to the noise of the
channel. Considering many copies of the base game and restricted communication, we show that
linking independent problems together yields a better payoff to the sender: the optimal strategy
correlates all messages with the state parameters of all problems. In this respect, our work bears
some similarity with Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007), who showed that a mechanism designer
can achieve more outcomes in an incentive compatible manner by linking many identical prob-
lems together.
The optimal payoff that we characterize is related to models where the cost of information is
measured by mutual information. Such information costs have been introduced in the literature
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on rational inattention by Sims (2003), (See also Martin, 2017; Matejka and McKay, 2015;
Steiner, Stewart, and Matejka, 2017). The use of mutual information has been axiomatized
in Morris and Strack (2019) and Hebert and Woodford (2018). In the context of persuasion,
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) consider a model where the sender gets his payoff from the game,
minus a cost that is proportional to the mutual information between the state and the message;
see also Matyskova (2018). With Lagrangian methods, we find that the value of our optimal
splitting problem with information constraint is the concave closure of the payoff function, net of
such an information cost, a similar concavification problem is found in Caplin and Dean (2013)
Different from those papers, the mutual information is not a primitive of our model. Our
finding is that the noise and limitations in communication induce a shadow cost measured by the
mutual information.
Entropy and mutual information appear endogenously in several papers on repeated games
where players have bounded rationality (Neyman and Okada, 1999, 2000), are not able to freely
randomize their actions (Gossner and Vieille, 2002), or observe actions imperfectly (Gossner and
Tomala, 2006, 2007). A related paper is Gossner, Hernández, and Neyman (2006), henceforth
GHN, who also consider a sender-receiver game. In GHN, the sender and the receiver play
an infinitely repeated game with common interests: both the sender and the receiver want to
choose the action that matches the state. The sender knows the infinite sequence of states and
can communicate with the receiver only through his actions. GHN characterize the best average
payoff that the sender (and the receiver) can achieve. Their solution resembles ours: the optimal
value is the payoff obtained when the sender can send a direct message to the receiver, subject
to an information constraint.
There are important differences with our work. First, GHN study a cheap talk game with
common interests. By contrast, we do not assume common interests and we assume commitment
power for the sender. Second, GHN is a truly repeated game model: at any given time t, both
players choose actions and the information of the receiver at this time consists of past actions.
In our case, the sender knows a finite sequence of states and chooses a finite sequence of input
messages, the receiver observes a finite sequence of output messages and chooses a sequence of
actions. This is why, rather than seeing our model as a repeated game of persuasion, we view it
as a spatial model with identical copies of the same problem coexisting at the same time. This
also explains why the number of copies n need not be equal to the number of times k the channel
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is used by the sender. Our result characterizes the optimal payoff as a function of the ratio of the
number n of pieces of information to the number k of channel uses. In particular, this allows us
to analyze cases where the channel is perfect (i.e. not subject to random noise) but with limited
input size: there are fewer messages than states or actions.
Cheap talk with a noisy channel has been studied by Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007)
who show that the presence of noise is possibly welfare improving. Such a phenomenon cannot
happen in the persuasion context as the sender could commit to replicate the noise. Relatedly,
Hernández and von Stengel (2014) consider a sender-receiver game with common interests over
an imperfect channel. In that paper, there is only one state known by the sender and one action
taken by the receiver, while the channel can be used a fixed number of times. Hernández and von
Stengel (2014) characterize all the Nash equilibria of this game and study the differences with
Shannon’s coding methods. Again, we do not assume common interests and assume commitment
power for the sender. More importantly, our focus is different and more in line with GHN: we do
not treat a single persuasion problem but a large sequence of them and use information theory
to study the asymptotics of the problem.
Our work is also related to some information theoretic literature. Following GHN, a line of
papers study empirical coordination between a sender and a receiver (Cuff, Permuter, and Cover,
2010; Cuff and Zhao, 2011; Le Treust, 2017). Assuming common interest between the sender
and the receiver, those papers characterize the asymptotic empirical distributions of (states, mes-
sages, actions) which are achievable, given the information structure and the noisy channel. The
closest paper in this literature is Le Treust and Tomala (2016) where we have studied empirical
coordination between a persuader and a decision maker induced by approximate equilibria as
the number of repetitions tends to infinity. Recently, Akyol, Langbort, and Başar (2017) have
considered the problem of Bayesian persuasion in a model with Gaussian states and channel and
quadratic functions as in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2 and
we state our main results in Section 3. In Section 4, we illustrate our results with a detailed
example. We provide an extension in Section 5 and concluding comments in Section 6. Proofs
are in the Appendix.
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2 Model
2.1 The persuasion problem
In this model, we consider a sender (S) and a receiver (R) engaged in a series of identical
persuasion problems and where the communication technology is fixed exogenously.
There is a finite state space Ω endowed with a prior probability distribution µ, a finite action
set A for the receiver, and each player i = S,R has a payoff function ui : Ω × A → R. There
is also a fixed communication channel (X,Y,Q), where X,Y are finite sets of messages and
Q : X → ∆(Y ) is a transition probability from X to Y (henceforth ∆(S) denotes the set of
probability distributions over the finite set S).
Given two integers n, k, we define a repeated persuasion problem where the uncertainty is
about a sequence ωn = (ω1, . . . , ωn) drawn i.i.d. from (Ω, µ). The receiver chooses a sequence of
actions an = (a1, . . . , an) and the payoff for player i = S,R is as follows:
u¯i(ω
n, an) =
1
n
∑n
t=1
ui(ωt, at).
To disclose information, the sender can use the channel k times by choosing a sequence of input
messages xk = (x1, . . . , xk). The channel then draws a sequence of output messages y
k with
probability Qk(yk|xk) =
∏k
t=1Q(yt|xt) and sends it to the receiver.
This defines the following persuasion game Γ(n, k):
1. The sender chooses a strategy σ : Ωn → ∆(Xk) which is announced to the receiver.
2. A sequence of states ωn is drawn i.i.d. from the prior µ, a sequence of input messages
xk is drawn with probability σ(xk|ωn), a sequence of output messages yk is drawn with
probability Qk(yk|xk) and is observed by the receiver.
3. The receiver chooses a sequence of actions an.
Then, player i = S,R gets the average payoff u¯i(ω
n, an).
Notice that for n = k = 1, this is the model of Tsakas and Tsakas (2018) of a single persuasion
problem with noisy communication. An interesting particular case is given by perfect channels
where X = Y and Q(y|x) = 1{y=x}. In such a case, the only limitation is given by the number of
messages. If we let n = k = 1 and choose a perfect channel with sufficiently many messages |X| =
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|Y | ≥ |Ω|, the model encompasses the standard persuasion game of Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011).
2.2 Optimal robust payoff
As a solution concept, we study the best payoff the sender can secure, regardless of which
best reply is chosen by the receiver. A strategy of the receiver is a mapping τ : Y k → An.
Knowing σ, the receiver chooses a best reply τ , which maximizes the expected payoff. That is,
for each yk:
τ(yk) ∈ argmax
an∈An
∑
ωn,xk
µn(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Q(yk|xk)u¯R(ω
n, an).
Denote BR(σ) the set of best replies of the receiver to the strategy σ.
Definition 2.1. The optimal robust payoff of the sender in this problem is as follows:
U∗S(µ
n, Qk) = sup
σ
min
τ∈BR(σ)
∑
ωn,xk,yk
µn(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Qk(yk|xk)u¯S(ω
n, τ(yk)).
This definition differs from the conventional solution to Bayesian persuasion of Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) where the receiver takes the best reply which is preferred by the sender.
Our choice is motivated by robustness; we ask the solution to be robust to the way the receiver
breaks ties3. We stress that this choice does not matter for generic problems. Indeed, with slight
perturbations of the payoff function of the receiver, we can make sure that indifferences occur
only at interior beliefs. When this is the case, the sender can slightly change his strategy in order
to avoid the indifference region.
The goal of this paper is to give an upper bound for the optimal robust payoff and to
characterize its limit when n and k tend to infinity.
2.3 Optimal splitting problem with information constraint
To state our main results, we introduce some definitions.
Definition 2.2. A splitting of µ ∈ ∆(Ω) is a finite family (λm, νm)m, where for each m, νm ∈
∆(Ω), λm ∈ [0, 1],
∑
m λm = 1 such that:
µ =
∑
m
λmνm. (1)
3A similar approach is followed by Inostroza and Pavan (2018) and Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2019).
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A splitting of µ is a distribution of posterior beliefs whose average equals the prior. An
“information structure” which draws a message m with probability P(m|ω) in state ω, induces
a splitting (λm, νm)m with λm =
∑
ω′ µ(ω
′)P(m|ω′) and νm(ω) =
µ(ω)P(m|ω)∑
ω′ µ(ω
′)P(m|ω′) . From the
splitting lemma (Aumann and Maschler, 1995) or Bayes plausibility (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011), for each decomposition of the prior belief into a convex combination of posterior µ =∑
m λmνm, the splitting (λm, νm)m is induced by some information structure, for example,
P(m|ω) = λmνm(ω)/µ(ω).
For each posterior belief ν ∈ ∆(Ω), let the set of optimal actions of the receiver be:
A∗(ν) = argmax
a∈A
∑
ω
ν(ω)uR(ω, a).
We denote by u∗S(ν) = mina∈A∗(ν)
∑
ω ν(ω)uS(ω, a) the robust payoff of the sender at the belief
ν, i.e., the payoff of the sender when the receiver chooses the optimal action, which is worst for
S.
We now introduce tools borrowed from information theory; the reader is referred to Cover
and Thomas (2006).
Definition 2.3. 1. The (Shannon) entropy of a probability distribution q ∈ ∆(S) over a finite
set S is as follows:
H(q) = −
∑
q
q(s) log q(s),
where the logarithm has basis 2 and 0 log 0 = 0.
2. The mutual information between two random variables (x,y), drawn from the joint proba-
bility distribution p(x)Q(y|x) is as follows:
Ip,Q(x;y) = H
(∑
x
p(x)Q(·|x)
)
−
∑
x
p(x)H(Q(·|x))
3. The capacity of the channel (X,Y,Q) is as follows:
C(Q) = max
p∈∆(X)
Ip,Q(x;y).
The channel capacity C(Q) is the maximal mutual information between two random vari-
ables (x,y), respectively the input and output of the channel, drawn from the joint probability
distribution p(x)Q(y|x), where the maximum is over the marginal distribution p(x). Intuitively,
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this is the maximal number of bits of information that can be transmitted reliably through the
channel (see Cover and Thomas, 2006).
Equipped with these tools, our main definition is the following.
Definition 2.4. For any c ≥ 0, the optimal splitting problem with information constraint is:
V (µ, c) = sup
∑
m
λmu
∗
S(νm)
s.t.
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
and H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(νm) ≤ c.
This is the best payoff that the sender can secure by choosing a splitting of the prior belief
(i.e., an information structure) under the constraint that the expected reduction of entropy
does not exceed the capacity c of the channel. The entropy reduction H(µ) −
∑
m λmH(νm) is
nonnegative and is the mutual information between a random state ω and a random message m,
drawn from the joint distribution
(
λmνm(ω)
)
(ω,m)
. The interpretation is thus that the sender
optimizes over a set of information structures that convey bounded information about the state.
Notice that V (µ, c) is less than or equal to the concave closure (or concavification) of u∗S at
µ which is the unconstrained supremum cav u∗S(µ) := sup
{∑
m λmu
∗
S(νm) :
∑
m λmνm = µ
}
.
3 Results
3.1 The main result
The main result of this paper shows that the value of the optimal splitting problem with
information constraint provides an upper bound to the optimal robust payoff and that the bound
is achieved asymptotically.
Theorem 3.1. 1. The optimal robust payoff of the sender is no more than the value of the
optimal splitting problem with information constraint. For each pair of integers n, k:
U∗S(µ
n, Qk) ≤ V
(
µ,
k
n
C(Q)
)
.
2. The optimal robust payoff of the sender converges to the value of the optimal splitting
problem with information constraint in the following sense. For each r ∈ [0,+∞], for each
pair of sequences of integers (kj , nj)j∈N such that lim
j→∞
max(nj , kj) = ∞ and lim
j→∞
kj
nj
= r,
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we have:
lim
j→∞
U∗S(µ
nj , Qkj ) = V
(
µ, rC(Q)
)
.
On the one hand, this result shows communication restrictions limits the payoff that can
be achieved through Bayesian persuasion. On the other hand, it quantifies the extent to which
repeating the same problem and linking the copies together helps in overcoming those restrictions.
3.1.1 Sketch of proof
We give an intuition for the main arguments of the proof; the technical details are in the
appendix.
First point, upper bound. The argument is that regardless of which strategies are used,
the mutual information between the states and the messages to the receiver cannot exceed the
capacity of the channel.
For simplicity, consider the case n = k = 1 where the result says U∗S(µ,Q) ≤ V (µ,C(Q)).
Take any strategy σ of the sender. This induces the splitting µ =
∑
y Pσ(y)νy where Pσ(y) =∑
ω,x µ(ω)σ(x|ω)Q(y|x) is the probability of the message y and
νy(ω) = Pσ(ω|y) =
∑
x µ(ω)σ(x|ω)Q(y|x)
Pσ(y)
is the posterior belief conditional on y. The mutual information of this splitting is:
H(µ)−
∑
y
Pσ(y)H(νy) := I(ω;y)
where (ω,x,y) denotes a random triple of state, input and output messages drawn from the
joint distribution µ(ω)σ(x|ω)Q(y|x). With an abuse of notation, we denote I(ω;y) the mutual
information between ω and y without explicit reference to the distribution.
Since x is a sufficient statistic for y, x is more informative4 about y than ω, that is I(ω;y) ≤
I(x;y). Then, the mutual information between the input and the output is no more than C(Q)
from the definition of the channel capacity.
The proof for general n and k is an elaboration of this argument. Since states are i.i.d., we
can prove that for any strategy, the average payoff is the one induced by some splitting whose
mutual information is no more than knC(Q). The trick is to introduce an auxiliary random
4See Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 2.8.1, p. 34.
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variable t uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n} and known by the receiver. Then, we regard the
average payoff over stages 1, . . . , n as the expected payoff for the randomly selected stage.
Second point, asymptotic construction. To make the intuition simple, let us consider a
sequence of pairs of integers (kj , nj)j∈N such that kj = nj and let k = n be a large term of this
sequence. Take a splitting (λm, νm)m of the prior µ which satisfies the information constraint.
We want to show that for large n, there is a strategy σ of the sender such that for any best reply
τ ∈ BR(σ) of the receiver, the payoff of the sender is at least about
∑
m λmu
∗
S(νm). Let also
a∗m ∈ A
∗(νm) such that u
∗
S(νm) =
∑
ω νm(ω)uS(ω, a
∗
m).
A first intuition for the construction is as follows. From Shannon’s coding Theorem5, if
I(ω;m) < C(Q), then for large n, there exists functions f1 : Ω
n → Mn, f2 : M
n → Xn and
g : Y n → Mn, altogether a coding/decoding scheme, with the following properties. Given a
sequence of states ωn, the sender calculates a sequence of messages mn = f1(ω
n) such that with
probability close to one, the empirical frequency of the (ωt,mt)’s is approximately the theoretical
one λmνm(ω). The sender then calculates a sequence of inputs x
n = f2(m
n) and sends them
into the channel. If the receiver calculates mˆn = g(yn), then the messages are recovered with
probability close to one: P(mn = mˆn) ≈ 1.
This argument is standard in information theory but is not sufficient for proving our result.
The proof is actually more complicated because the strategic receiver actually calculates the
Bayesian posterior P(ωn|yn) and chooses at stage t an action at ∈ A
∗(P(ωt|y
n)). Thus, the
main task is to refine the construction in such a way that for any best reply of the receiver,
with probability close to one, the optimal action at ∈ A
∗(P(ωt|y
n)) is equal to the recommended
action a∗mˆt at most stages, that is, for a set of stages whose proportion is close to one. This
implies that the payoff is approximately the target one.
The proof consists of three main steps. In the first step, we show that for each ε > 0, we
can find a splitting ε-optimal for V (µ, c), which satisfies the information constraint with strict
inequality and such that for each posterior νm, the action a
∗
m which minimizes the sender payoff
over A∗(νm) is unique in a neighborhood of νm. This latter property ensures that the receiver
plays a∗m whenever its belief is close to νm. We deduce that the difference between the realized
payoff and the target payoff is bounded by the number of times t where the Bayesian posterior
P(ωt|y
n) is far away from νmˆt . The goal is then to show that this number is small with probability
5See Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 10.4.1, p. 318.
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close to one.
The second step consists in defining Shannon’s strategy for this splitting. There, we adapt
known construction from information theory to our setting.
At the third step, we prove that, under our construction, with probability close to one, the
Bayesian posteriors P(ωt|y
n) are close enough to the target posteriors νmt at most stages. This
allows us to conclude that with probability close to one, the receiver plays the recommended
actions at most stages and that the expected payoff is close to the target one. This step,
where we estimate the realized Bayesian beliefs, is new compared to the information theoretic
literature, which typically focuses on the average number of mistakes in decoding. Summing
up, our construction is similar to the ones found in this literature but is adapted to the context
where the receiver is maximizing its payoff. 
3.1.2 Implications
We now provide some direct implications of the theorem.
Large capacity. Reordering the information constraint as
∑
m λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ) − c, we see
that if c ≥ H(µ), the constraint is satisfied by all splittings. The value of the problem is thus
the unconstrained concavification of u∗S :
c ≥ H(µ)⇒ V (µ, c) = cav u∗S(µ).
As a consequence, if we fix n and Q and choose k large enough such that knC(Q) ≥ H(µ), then
the sender can achieve approximately the unconstrained maximum cav u∗S(µ).
The intuition is simple: for fixed size of the state space, if the imperfect channel can be used
a large number of times, then the sender is able to convey any message with arbitrarily high
probability. More precisely, suppose C(Q) > 0 that is to say, Q(·|x) is not constant with respect
to x. There exist distributions of inputs pm ∈ ∆(X) that statistically identify the message:
m 6= m′ ⇒
∑
x
pm(x)Q(·|x) 6=
∑
x
pm′(x)Q(·|x).
For each message m, the sender can draw an i.i.d. sequence of messages x1, . . . , xk from pm and
sends them through the channel. The posterior belief of the receiver conditional on y1, . . . , yk
then converges to the truth (the Dirac mass on m). Thus, asymptotically, the distributions of
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actions of the receiver will be close to the one under perfect communication.
Small capacity. When c is close to 0, the information constraint H(µ) −
∑
m λmH(νm) ≤ c
implies that the splitting is almost nonrevealing since:6
∑
m
λm‖νm − µ‖1 ≤
√
2 ln 2
(
H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(νm)
)
.
It follows that V (µ, c) is approximately u∗S(µ), the payoff obtained without any information
transmission.
As a consequence, if we fix Q and k, then for large n, the sender cannot get substantially
more than u∗S(µ).
Perfect channels. Our result applies to communication channels without noise. A communi-
cation channel has two sources of imperfection: the noise and the number of available messages,
which is given exogenously. One insight of our work is that all that matters for the analysis is
the capacity of the channel.
A channel (X,Y,Q) is called perfect if X = Y and Q(y|x) = 1{x=y}. For each integer m ≥ 2,
we denote Q∗m the perfect communication channel with m messages where m = |X| = |Y |. Its
capacity is7 C(Q∗m) = logm. We apply our results to the optimal robust payoff U
∗
S(µ
n, Q∗m) of
the game where the persuasion problem is repeated n times and where the sender can send one
message from a set with cardinality m. Our method applies since for large m, the channel Q∗m
can be seen as having the use of a binary perfect channel k times, with k = log2m.
There are two simple extreme cases. First, if m = 1, the capacity of the channel is 0 and
the sender cannot convey any information. Thus, U∗S(µ
n, Q∗m) = V (µ, 0) = u
∗
S(µ). Second,
if m ≥ |Ω|n, then the sender can secure the unconstrained persuasion payoff U∗S(µ
n, Q∗m) =
V (µ, log |Ω|) = cav u∗S(µ) by treating each of the n problems separately and getting the payoff
cav u∗S(µ) for each instance. The first point of Theorem 3.1 shows that this is the best possible
payoff.
More generally, Theorem 3.1 implies the following.
Corollary 3.2. Consider a persuasion problem repeated n times, where the sender sends one
message from a set of cardinality m. Then:
6See Cover and Thomas, 2006, Lemma 11.6.1, p. 370.
7See Cover and Thomas, 2006, p. 184.
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1. U∗S(µ
n, Q∗m) ≤ V (µ,
logm
n ).
2. For any pair of sequences of integers (mj , nj)j∈N such that lim
j→∞
max(mj , nj) = ∞ and
lim
j→∞
logmj
nj
= c, we have lim
j→∞
U∗S(µ
nj , Q∗mj ) = V (µ, c).
Proof. The first point follows directly from Theorem 3.1. To see the second point, it is enough
to remark that a perfect channel Q∗m is “close” to k copies of a perfect binary channel with k
such that 2k ≤ m < 2k+1, that is k = ⌊logm⌋. Having more messages at disposal is beneficial
for the sender and thus U∗S(µ
n, Q∗m) is weakly increasing with m. It follows that:
U∗S(µ
n, (Q∗2)
k) ≤ U∗S(µ
n, Q∗m) ≤ U
∗
S(µ
n, (Q∗2)
k+1).
Take a sequence (mj , nj)j∈N such that lim
j→∞
max(mj , nj) = ∞ and lim
j→∞
logmj
nj
= c, and define
kj = ⌊logmj⌋. We have lim
j→∞
max(kj , nj) = ∞, lim
j→∞
kj
nj
= c and the conclusion follows from
Theorem 3.1.
3.2 Concavification with information constraint
In this section, we give some properties of the optimal splitting problem under information
constraint. The motivation for this part of the results is two-fold. First, it is known than in
a concavification problem, the number of posteriors (or of messages) can be chosen less than
or equal to the number of states. One might wonder whether this remains true when there is
a constraint on the feasible splittings. Second, models with costly information often use the
mutual information as information cost (See e.g. Sims, 2003). We will see that in our case, this
is derived by writing a Lagrangian for V (µ, c).
Consider the optimal splitting under information constraint:
sup
{∑
m
λmu
∗
S(νm) :
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
∑
m
λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ)− c
}
.
This is a special instance of the following optimization problem. Let f, g : X → R ∪ {−∞} be
two functions defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rd, where X represents an abstract set of posteriors,
f is a payoff function and g is a constraint capturing the feasible splittings. For x ∈ X and γ ∈ R
consider the problem:
F g(x, γ) := sup
{∑
m
λmf(xm) :
∑
m
λmxm = x,
∑
m
λmg(xm) ≥ γ
}
.
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Let f g : X × R→ R ∪ {−∞} defined by:
f g(x, γ) =

f(x) if γ ≤ g(x),
−∞ otherwise.
Theorem 3.3. Then, for each (x, γ) ∈ X × R,
1. F g(x, γ) = cav f g(x, γ).
2. F g(x, γ) = inft≥0
{
cav (f + tg)(x) − tγ
}
.
Applying this result to the optimal splitting under information constraint, we get:
Corollary 3.4. For each µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and c ≥ 0,
1. V (µ, c) is the concavification of the function uHS : ∆(Ω)× R→ R defined as:
uHS (ν, η) =

u∗S(ν) if η ≤ H(ν),
−∞ otherwise,
calculated at (ν, η) = (µ,H(µ)− c).
2. V (µ, c) = inft≥0
{
cav (u∗S + tH)(µ)− t(H(µ)− c)
}
.
Since it might be useful in other contexts, Theorem 3.3 is stated for general functions rather
than specifically for the entropy function. This result has recently been generalized by Doval
and Skreta (2018) to splitting problems with several constraints. The first point of the theorem
states that the concavification with constraint, is the concavification of a bivariate function
where an additional variable is added for the constraint (many variables when there are many
constraints, see Doval and Skreta, 2018). The second point states that a Lagrangian function
can be introduced and that the concavification under constraint is the concavification of the
Lagrangian for some multiplier. The proof is in the Appendix (A.2).
A direct implication of the second point of Corollary 3.4 is that there exists t∗ = t∗(µ, c) such
that:
V (µ, c) = cav (u∗S + t
∗H)(µ)− t∗(H(µ)− c).
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To see the existence of t∗, notice that cav (u∗S+tH)(µ)−t(H(µ)−c) ≥ (u
∗
S+tH)(µ)−t(H(µ)−c) =
u∗S(µ) + tc, which tends to +∞ as t → +∞. Therefore, t 7→ cav (u
∗
S + tH)(µ) − t(H(µ) − c)
reaches a minimum at some t∗.
If (λ∗m, ν
∗
m)m is an optimal splitting, let I
∗ = H(µ)−
∑
m λ
∗
mH(ν
∗
m) be its mutual information.
We have the following:
V (µ, c) =
∑
m
λ∗mu
∗
S(ν
∗
m)− t
∗(I∗ − c). (2)
We then find the usual Kuhn-Tucker slackness conditions. If I∗ < c, then t∗ = 0 and the
unconstrained optimum is feasible. If t∗ > 0, the constraint is binding. The Lagrange multiplier
t∗ can be interpreted as the shadow price of capacity, that is, the marginal value of an extra unit
of communication capacity.
This characterization can be related with the cost of information considered in the literature
on rational inattention (See Sims, 2003) where the agent pays a cost proportional to the mutual
information between the state and the signal he observes. In particular, Caplin and Dean (2013)
consider the concavification of a utility function net of such an information cost. For persuasion
games, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) assume that the sender pays a cost for choosing a disclo-
sure strategy which is also related to the mutual information and also take the concavification
of the net utility function.
Equation (2) can be seen as a microfoundation of the use of mutual information as the in-
formation cost: the limit optimal value of persuasion for a large number of copies of problems
with communication over an imperfect channel, has the same value as a problem of persuasion
with an information cost. There are some differences, however. First, the information cost is not
the mutual information, but the difference between the mutual information and the capacity of
the channel. That is, a cost reduces the payoff only when the sender would like to send more
information bits than the capacity. Second, the unit price of capacity is endogenous and given
by the Lagrange multiplier of the information constraint.
A direct implication is an upper bound of the number of posteriors needed to achieve the
concavification.
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Corollary 3.5. In the optimization problem,
V (µ, c) = sup
{∑
m
λmu
∗
S(νm) :
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
∑
m
λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ)− c
}
,
the number of posteriors can be chosen to be at most min{|A|, |Ω| + 1}.
Without the information constraint, the usual bound is min{|A|, |Ω|}: the number of posteri-
ors or of messages can be upper bounded by the number of actions and the number of states. For
the number of actions, the argument is that two messages for which the receiver chooses the same
action can be merged into one and the corresponding two posteriors replaced by the average.
The argument still holds due to the concavity of the entropy function: replacing two posteriors
by their average increases the expected entropy and thus helps in satisfying the information
constraint.
For the bound given by the number of states, the usual technical argument is that any point
in the convex hull of the hypograph of a function on ∆(Ω) is a convex combination involving |Ω|
points. From Corollary 3.4, we consider the concavification of a function defined on ∆(Ω)×R a
domain with one extra dimension; thus, an extra posterior might be needed. A similar observation
is made in Boleslavsky and Kim (2018), where due to an incentive constraint, an extra posterior
is needed. In Section 4, we provide an example where |Ω|+1 posteriors are used at the optimum.
4 Illustrating example
4.1 Unrestricted communication
In this example, the sender is a firm that persuades the receiver to invest in a risky project.
If the receiver does not invest (action a0), the payoff is 0 for both players. If the receiver invests
(action a1), the project has return −7 in the bad state ω0 and +1 in the good state ω1. Both
states are equally likely. The sender receives a fee of +1 only if the receiver invests. The payoff
table is as follows, the entries are pairs of payoffs for the players i = S,R depending on the state
and action.
a0 a1 µ
ω0 0, 0 1,−7
1
2
ω1 0, 0 1, 1
1
2
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The receiver invests for sure only when he holds a belief ν such that ν(ω1) > 7/8. If ν(ω1) =
7/8 he is indifferent. Assuming that in case of indifference he does not invest, the robust payoff
of the sender u∗S(ν) is 1 if ν(ω1) > 7/8 and 0 otherwise.
0
u∗S(ν)
1
1 ν(ω1)7
8
1
2
cav u∗S(
1
2) =
4
7
b
b
b
b
Figure 1: Concavification.
The concavification function cav u∗S(ν) is continuous and equal to
8
7ν(ω1) for ν(ω1) ≤
7
8 and
1 otherwise. It is easy to see that it does not depend on the action chosen by the receiver at
ν(ω1) =
7
8 , see Figure 1. If the receiver were to choose a1 at the point of indifference, then the
optimal splitting for the sender would be as follows:
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
=
3
7
(
1, 0
)
+
4
7
(
1
8
,
7
8
)
,
where a belief is denoted ν = (ν(ω0), ν(ω1)). This yields a payoff of
4
7 which is the highest that
the sender can achieve given the uniform prior. For any small ε > 0, we can perturb the previous
splitting and get the following:
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
=
3 + 8ε
7 + 8ε
(
1, 0
)
+
4
7 + 8ε
(
1
8
− ε,
7
8
+ ε
)
,
which achieves the payoff 47+8ε irrespective of the tie-breaking rule. Letting ε tend 0, we see that
the sender achieves a payoff arbitrarily close to 47 , which is the optimal robust payoff.
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4.2 Restricted and noisy communication
We consider binary sets of messages X = {x0, x1}, Y = {y0, y1} and we assume that the
channel has a noise level ε ∈ [0, 12 ], that is Q(yj|xi) = ε for j 6= i, see Figure 2. The generic
case is ε ∈ (0, 12) where the label of the message (0 or 1) is changed with positive probability but
observing a label 1 is still more likely when the input label is 1. When ε = 12 , the distribution of
the output message is independent from the input message, so the channel completely disrupts
the communication.
x1
x0
b
b
b
b
y1
y0
1− ε
1− ε
ε
ε
Figure 2: Binary symmetric channel.
A special case is the binary perfect channel when ε = 0: identifying together the sets X and
Y , an input message x is received with certainty. Communication is then restricted only by the
number of available messages, i.e. the cardinality of X.
The capacity of the binary symmetric channel8 is 1−H(ε) where with some abuse of notation,
H(ε) denotes the entropy of the binary probability distribution (ε, 1− ε).
4.3 One-shot scenario k = n = 1
Let a strategy σ of the sender be parametrized by σ(x0|ω0) = 1 − α and σ(x1|ω1) = 1 − β;
see Figure 3.
ω1
ω0
µ(ω1)
µ(ω0)
b
b
b
b
b
x1
x0
b
b
b
b
y1
y0
1− ε
1− ε
ε
ε
1− α
1− β
α
β
Figure 3: Strategy on the binary symmetric channel.
8Cover and Thomas, 2006, Example 2.1.1, p. 15.
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Then, Pσ(y1|ω0) = α(1− ε)+ (1−α)ε, Pσ(y0|ω1) = β(1− ε)+ (1−β)ε and from Bayes’ rule,
Pσ(ω1|y1) =
µ(ω1)(1− Pσ(y0|ω1))
µ(ω0)Pσ(y1|ω0) + µ(ω1)(1− Pσ(y0|ω1))
,
Pσ(ω1|y0) =
µ(ω1)Pσ(y0|ω1)
µ(ω0)(1− Pσ(y1|ω0)) + µ(ω1)Pσ(y0|ω1)
.
It is easy to see that the numbers Pσ(y1|ω0), Pσ(y0|ω1), Pσ(ω1|y1), Pσ(ω1|y0) all belong to the
interval [ε, 1 − ε].
A pair of posteriors (ν0, ν1) is said to be feasible in the one-shot scenario if there exists a
number λ ∈ [0, 1] such that:
(µ(ω0), µ(ω1)) = λ(ν0(ω0), ν0(ω1)) + (1− λ)(ν1(ω0), ν1(ω1)).
The feasible splittings can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 4.1. We consider the one-shot problem where n = k = 1. A pair of posteriors (ν0, ν1)
is feasible if and only if ν1 = ν0 = µ or,
ε ≤
ν0(ω1)(ν1(ω1)− µ(ω1))
µ(ω1)(ν1(ω1)− ν0(ω1))
≤ 1− ε
and
ε ≤
(1− ν0(ω1))(µ(ω1)− ν0(ω1))
(1− µ(ω1))(ν1(ω1)− ν0(ω1))
≤ 1− ε.
The proof is in Appendix A.1. As an illustration, take the uniform prior (12 ,
1
2) and a level of
noise ε = 14 . The feasible posteriors are shown by the colored green regions on Figure 5.
From the previous discussion, it is impossible to induce beliefs with ν(ω1) >
3
4 . Therefore,
the receiver will never be confident enough to invest and the payoff is 0 for the sender.
4.4 Asymptotic scenario with k = n→∞
We consider the case where k = n tends to infinity with a noise level of ε = 14 and compute
the value of the optimal splitting problem with information constraint. The capacity of the
channel is 1−H(14), the entropy of the uniform prior is 1; therefore, the information constraint
is
∑
m λmH(µm) ≥ H(
1
4 ). Under this constraint the optimal splitting for the sender satisfies:
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= λ
(
1
8
,
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)(ν0(ω0), ν0(ω1))
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and
H
(
1
4
)
= λH
(
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)H(ν0(ω1)).
To see why it is optimal, first observe that the sender has to bring on some posterior, denoted
by ν1, with ν1(ω1) >
7
8 in order to get some payoff. To get it with the highest probability, he
should aim for ν1(ω1) =
7
8 . Among the posteriors that induce investment, this is also the one
with highest entropy. Second, to maximize expected payoffs, the remaining posteriors must be as
far away as possible from the prior; that is, the information constraint should bind. Additionally,
note that only one posterior, denoted by ν0, will be optimally generated in the region ν0(ω1) <
7
8 .
Since the entropy is strictly concave, replacing two posteriors on this region by their average does
not change the payoff and increases the entropy.
Solving these two equations numerically we get, ν0(ω1) ≈ 0.340 and V (µ,Q) = λ ≈ 0.298
instead of the zero value for the one-shot scenario and about 52.1% of the unconstrained optimum
4
7 .
This is shown in Figure 4 which plots the payoff function and the entropy function. The
splitting of µ into ν0, ν1 is shown by the three points on the horizontal axis. On the vertical line
µ(ω1) =
1
2 , we can read the average payoff with the red line and the average entropy with the
green line. To see optimality on the picture, if we move ν0(ω1) to the right, then the average
payoff decrease, and if we move it to the left, the average entropy will fall below H(14) and the
information constraint will be violated.
The optimal splitting is also marked on Figure 5 which shows the set of pairs of posteriors
for the splittings that satisfy the information constraint (union of green and blue regions).
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01 1
1 ν(ω1)
H(ν)u∗S(ν)
µ(ω
1 ) =
1
2
H(14 )
V (µ,C(Q)) ≈ 0.298
b
b
b
b
b
b
ν
1 (ω
1 ) =
7
8
ν
0 (ω
1 ) ≈
0.340
Figure 4: For a noise parameter ε = 14 , the optimal splitting is given by ν0(ω1) ≈ 0.340 and
ν1(ω1) =
7
8 .
0
1
1
2
1
4
3
4
11
2
1
4
3
4
ν0(ω1)
ν1(ω1)
bν0(ω1) ≈ 0.340
ν
1 (ω
1 ) =
7
8
Figure 5: For a noise parameter ε = 14 , the green lenses correspond to the feasible posteriors
(ν0, ν1) characterized in Lemma 4.1 for the one-shot scenario k = n = 1. The blue and green
regions correspond to the feasible posteriors (ν0, ν1) in the asymptotic scenario where k = n→∞.
The red point corresponds to the optimal splitting, also depicted in Figure 4. The hatched areas
correspond to the nonfeasible posteriors (ν0, ν1).
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On Figure 6, we represent the value V (µ,C(Q)) of the optimal splitting problem as a function
of the prior µ, for different values for the noise parameter ε ∈
{
1
20 ,
3
20 ,
1
4 ,
7
20 ,
9
20 ,
99
200
}
. It is found
by solving the following system for ν0:
(µ(ω0), µ(ω1)) = λ
(
1
8
,
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)(ν0(ω0), ν0(ω1))
and
H(µ(ω1))− 1 +H(ε) = λH
(
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)H(ν0(ω1)).
When µ(ω1) =
1
2 and ε =
1
4 , we recover the value V (µ,C(Q)) ≈ 0.298 as in Figure 4.
0
1
1 µ(ω1)
V (µ,C(Q))
b
ε = 99200
ε = 920
ε = 720
ε = 14
ε = 320
ε = 120
V (µ,C(Q)) ≈ 0.298
µ(ω
1 ) =
1
2
Figure 6: Value of the optimal splitting problem as a function of the prior µ, for different noise
parameters ε ∈
{
1
20 ,
3
20 ,
1
4 ,
7
20 ,
9
20 ,
99
200
}
.
Observe that the function V (µ,C(Q)) is not concave with respect to the prior µ. From
Corollary 3.4, V (µ, c) is the concavification of the function uHS calculated at (µ,H(µ) − c), so
this composed function need not be concave.
4.5 Perfect binary channel with k = n
2
→∞
We consider the same example as before, repeated n times with the uniform prior µ = (12 ,
1
2 ).
In line with the motivating example from the introduction, we consider a perfect channel and
assume that the sender has at its disposal half as many messages as needed to communicate
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perfectly, that is k = n2 . Since the capacity of the binary perfect channel is one,
k
n =
1
2 and
H(µ) = 1, the information constraint is:
H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(µm) ≤
1
2
⇐⇒
∑
m
λmH(µm) ≥
1
2
.
Observe that this constraint is identical to the one obtained with a binary symmetric channel
with noise ε such that H(ε) = 12 (i.e., ε ≈ 0.110). Therefore, the optimal splitting is given by
the following system:
(µ(ω0), µ(ω1)) = λ
(
1
8
,
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)(ν0(ω0), ν0(ω1))
and
1
2
= λH
(
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)H(ν0(ω1)).
Solving numerically, we find V (µ, 12) ≈ 0.519.
4.6 On the number of posteriors
We give now an example showing the tightness of the bound min{|A|, |Ω|+1} on the number
of posteriors, given in Corollary 3.5. The payoff table is as follows:
a0 a1 a2
ω0 0, 0 1,−7 1, 1
1
2
ω1 0, 0 1, 1 1,−7
1
2
There are two risky projects (a1 and a2) and the sender wants to persuade the receiver to invest
in any of them. The receiver invests only if ν(ω1) > 7/8 or ν(ω1) < 1/8.
With unrestricted communication, the solution is clear: the sender fully discloses the state
and gets a payoff of 1. However, with a binary symmetric channel with noise ε = 1/4, the sender
gets 0 in the one-shot scenario. Consider now the case where k = n→∞.
The “one-sided” solution of Section 4.4 is feasible. Recall that this is the splitting such that:
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= λ
(
1
8
,
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)(ν0(ω0), ν(ω1))
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and
H
(
1
4
)
= λH
(
7
8
)
+ (1− λ)H(ν0(ω0), ν0(ω1)).
with ν0(ω1) ≈ 0.340 and λ ≈ 0.298. It is easy to see that this is optimal among the splittings
with two posteriors. Indeed, it is not possible that the two posteriors induce investment while
satisfying the information constraint.
However, this is not optimal. The optimal splitting has three posteriors and is as follows:
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= (1− λ)
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
+
λ
2
(
1
8
,
7
8
)
+
λ
2
(
7
8
,
1
8
)
with
H
(
1
4
)
= (1− λ)H
(
1
2
)
+
λ
2
H
(
1
8
)
+
λ
2
H
(
7
8
)
.
This pins down a unique λ and solving numerically yields λ ≈ 0.413. Since λ is the probability
of investment, we get V (µ,Q) ≈ 0.413 which is about 38% better than what is achieved with a
splitting with two points.
To see that this is optimal, first since there are two states, we know that three posteriors
are sufficient. Second, it is not possible to have all posteriors in the investment region and to
satisfy the information constraint. If there is only one posterior in the investment region, then
the splitting achieves no more than the “one-sided” solution. Therefore, it is optimal to have two
posteriors in the investment region and one outside of it. However, then, it is optimal to choose
the point in the middle region to be (12 ,
1
2 ), since this is the one with the highest entropy.
5 Beyond identical problems
The main result can be extended to series of persuasion problems which are not all identical,
but such that each type of problem is repeated many times. Suppose that we have a family of
persuasion problems indexed by a type parameter z in a finite set Z. That is, for every z ∈ Z,
there is a prior probability distribution µ(·|z) ∈ ∆(Ω) and payoff functions ui(·, z) : Ω×A→ R for
each player i = S,R. The series of persuasion problems is given by a sequence zn = (z1, . . . , zn)
which is commonly known by both players. The distribution of states is as follows:
µn(ωn|zn) :=
∏n
t=1
µ(ωt|zt).
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If the sequence of states and actions are respectively ωn, an, the payoff for player i is 1n
∑n
t=1 ui(ωt, at, zt).
The communication technology is still given by a channel Q : X → ∆(Y ) used k times, so that
the strategy sets are the same as before for both players. The optimal robust payoff of the sender
is defined as before and is denoted by U∗S(µ
n, Qk, zn).
For each posterior belief ν ∈ ∆(Ω) and type z ∈ Z, the set of optimal actions of the receiver is
A∗z(ν) = argmax a∈A
∑
ω ν(ω)uR(ω, a, z) and we denote by u
∗z
S (ν) = mina∈A∗z(ν)
∑
ω ν(ω)uS(ω, a, z)
the robust payoff of the sender at the belief ν.
Definition 5.1. For pi ∈ ∆(Z) and c ≥ 0, the optimal splitting problem with information
constraint is as follows:
V Z(µ, c, pi) = sup
∑
z
pi(z)
∑
m
λzmu
∗z
S (ν
z
m)
s.t.
∑
m
λzmν
z
m = µ(·|z), ∀z ∈ Z,
and
∑
z
pi(z)
(
H(µ(·|z)) −
∑
m
λzmH(ν
z
m)
)
≤ c.
The interpretation is as follows. Suppose that pi(z) represents the probability, or frequency, of
occurrence of z. Conditional on z which is known by both players, the sender performs a spitting
of µ(·|z),
∑
m λ
z
mν
z
m = µ(·|z), and gets the payoff
∑
m λ
z
mu
∗z
S (ν
z
m). The information constraint
imposes the average mutual information to be less than or equal to the capacity.
Given a sequence zn ∈ Zn, let pin ∈ ∆(Z) be the empirical frequency induced by the sequence:
for each z ∈ Z, pin(z) =
1
n |{t : zt = z}|.
Theorem 5.2. 1. The optimal robust payoff of the sender is no more than the value of the
optimal splitting problem with information constraint. For each pair of integers n, k:
U∗S(µ
n, Qk, zn) ≤ V Z(µ,
k
n
C(Q), pin).
2. The optimal robust payoff of the sender converges to the value of the optimal splitting
problem with information constraint in the following sense. For each pi ∈ ∆(Z) and r ∈
[0,+∞], for each pair of sequences of integers (kj , nj)j∈N such that lim
j→∞
max(nj , kj) =∞,
lim
j→∞
kj
nj
= r and lim
j→∞
pinj = pi, we have:
lim
j→∞
U∗S(µ
nj , Qkj , znj ) = V Z(µ, rC(Q), pi).
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Given a sequence zn, pin is the empirical distribution of types of problems. The optimal payoff
of the sender is bounded above by the value of optimal splitting under information constraint.
Suppose that the distribution of types is held fixed (or converges to) pi, then when n and k
grow large, the sender is able to secure approximately this value. The arguments of the proof of
Theorem 3.1 extend quite easily to this case (up to lengthy adaptations for the second point) so
the proof is omitted.
This extension applies to the case where the proportions of types of problems are fixed.
Alternatively, the sequence zn could be drawn i.i.d. from a prior distribution pi ∈ ∆(Z).
Notice the channel Qk is used for transferring information about all problems. Thus, Theorem
5.2 does more than merely patching up distinct families of problems together. The capacity of
the channel bounds the total amount of information, across all problems. Thus, all problems,
even of different types, are linked together in the messages.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a persuasion game where the sender communicates with the receiver
through a fixed and imperfect channel. The optimal payoff of the sender is bounded above
by the value of the optimal splitting problem with information constraint. When the sender and
the receiver are engaged in many repetitions of identical persuasion games, the optimal payoff
for the sender converges to the upper bound as the number of repetitions increases.
There are several interesting variations or extensions of this model.
1. Private information of the receiver. In the model, it is assumed that the information about
the state if fully controlled by the sender. To model private information of the receiver,
consider the extension of the previous section, let nature draw pairs (ωt, zt)t=1,...,n and
assume that ωn is the private information of the sender and zn is the private information
of the receiver. Our methods generalize to this case provided that we use a suitable gen-
eralization of the information constraint. A random message m can be transmitted over
the channel provided that its mutual information with the state, conditional on the private
information of the receiver I(ω;m|z) ≤ C is less than or equal to the capacity, where
I(ω;m|z) :=
∑
z
P(z)I(ω;m|z = z)
is the expectation over z of the mutual information conditional on {z = z}.
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2. Commitment of the receiver. In the persuasion model, the sender first chooses its strategy
and is committed to playing it. A natural twist is to let the receiver choose his strategy
first and commit to it. This turns into a mechanism design problem where the receiver
is a principal offering a contract to an informed agent (the sender), and where the agent
communicates with the principal through an imperfect channel. Again, an information
constraint holds, but the impact of incentives is different. Namely for each sequence of
states (ω1, . . . , ωn), the sender/agent should not have an incentive to behave as if it was
another one (ω′1, . . . , ω
′
n). The task is to prove that using the usual coding scheme is indeed
an optimal strategy for the agent, or rather that any optimal strategy is not too different
from the coding scheme. This variation is under close study.
3. More general processes. It would be interesting to generalize the results to a larger class of
stochastic processes of states. Information theoretic methods can be extended to Markov
chains, see Cover and Thomas (2006) and to more general processes, see Han (2003). While
an information constraint would certainly hold, it is an open problem to characterize the
optimal payoff for the sender. What is the best way to exploit the correlations between
states?
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A Appendix
This appendix contains all the formal proofs.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
For a, b in [0, 1], consider the system:
ν1(ω1) =
µ(ω1)(1 − b)
µ(ω0)a+ µ(ω1)(1− b)
, ν0(ω1) =
µ(ω1)b
µ(ω0)(1 − a) + µ(ω1)b
. (3)
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If ν1 = ν0 = µ, then it must be that a = 1 − b. Otherwise, ν1(ω1) 6= ν0(ω1). It is easily verified
that the system has a unique solution given by:
b =
ν0(ω1)(ν1(ω1)− µ(ω1))
µ(ω1)(ν1(ω1)− ν0(ω1))
and
a =
(1− ν0(ω1))(µ(ω1)− ν0(ω1))
(1− µ(ω1))(ν1(ω1)− ν0(ω1))
.
Take a strategy σ defined by σ(x0|ω0) = 1 − α and σ(x1|ω1) = 1 − β and a binary symmetric
channel with noise ε. The posteriors ν1, ν0 are given by the system (3) for a := α(1−ε)+ε(1−α)
and b := β(1− ε) + ε(1− β). As α, β vary in [0, 1], a and b range freely over [ε, 1 − ε],
{(α(1 − ε) + ε(1 − α), β(1 − ε) + ε(1− β)) : (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2} = [ε, 1− ε]2.
This concludes the proof. 
A.2 Proofs for Sections 3.2
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3, point 1
The function cav f g(x, γ) is given by the following program:
sup
∑
m
λmf(xm)
s.t.
∑
m
λmxm = x,
∑
m
λmγm = γ
and ∀m,γm ≤ g(xm).
Take a family (λm, xm, γm)m feasible for this program. We have
∑
m λmg(xm) ≥ γ, thus this
family is feasible for F g(x, γ). Therefore, cav f g(x, γ) ≤ F g(x, γ).
Conversely, take a family (λm, xm)m such that
∑
m λmxm = x and
∑
m λmg(xm) ≥ γ. Let
γ¯ =
∑
m λmg(xm) and for each m, γm = g(xm) + γ − γ¯. Then,
∑
m λmγm = γ and since γ¯ ≥ γ,
for each m, γm ≤ g(xm). Thus, (λm, xm, γm)m is feasible for cav f
g(x, γ) and cav f g(x, γ) ≥
F g(x, γ). 
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A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3, point 2
Recall that the Fenchel conjugate of f : X ⊆ Rd → R is f∗(p) = supx{x · p − f(x)}, where
x · p denotes the inner product. Then, the largest convex function below f is equal to (f∗)∗
(Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 12.1.1, p. 103), therefore (f∗)∗(x) = −cav (−f)(x). Playing with
signs, it follows that:
cav f(x) = inf
p
{
x · p+ sup
y
{f(y)− p · y}
}
. (4)
We apply this formula to the function:
f g(x, γ) =

f(x) if γ ≤ g(x),
−∞ otherwise.
This gives,
cav f g(x, γ) = inf
p,z
{
p · x+ zγ + sup
y,η
{f g(y, η) − p · y − zη}
}
= inf
p,z
{
p · x+ zγ + sup
y,η: η≤g(y)
{f(y)− p · y − zη}
}
.
If z > 0 then by letting η → −∞, the sup is +∞. Therefore, in the infimum we can restrict to
z ≤ 0. Setting t = −z ≥ 0 we get:
cav f g(x, γ) = inf
t≥0,p
{
p · x− tγ + sup
y,η: η≤g(y)
{f(y)− p · y + tη}
}
= inf
t≥0,p
{
p · x− tγ + sup
y
{f(y)− p · y + tg(y)}
}
= inf
t≥0
{
inf
p
{
p · x+ sup
y
{f(y) + tg(y)− p · y}
}
− tγ
}
where the second line holds since t ≥ 0 and the third line is just reorganizing. The result follows
by remarking that infp
{
p · x+ supy{f(y) + tg(y)− p · y}
}
= cav (f + tg)(x). 
A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 3.5, upper bound |Ω|+ 1
Corollary 3.5 follows from a well-known fact about concavification.
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Fact A.1. In the optimization problem,
cav f(x) = sup
{∑
m
λmf(xm) :
∑
m
λmxm = x
}
,
where f is defined on X ⊆ Rd, the number of points can be restricted to d+ 1. That is, without
loss of generality, the supremum is taken over families (λm, xm)
d+1
m=1.
The reader is referred to Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 17.1.5, p. 157). This implies that in a
persuasion problem with unrestricted communication, the number of messages can be bounded
by the dimension of ∆(Ω) plus one, that is the number of states.
Corollary A.2. In the optimisation problem,
F g(x, γ) = sup
{∑
m
λmf(xm) :
∑
m
λmxm = x,
∑
m
λmg(xm) ≥ γ
}
where f is defined on X ⊆ Rd, the number of points can be restricted to d+ 2.
This follows from Corollary 3.4 and Fact A.1, since the function f g is defined on X ×R ⊆ Rd+1.
Applying to the problem of optimal splitting under information constraint, gives a number of
messages bounded by the dimension of ∆(Ω) plus two, that is the number of states plus one. 
A.2.4 Proof of Corollary 3.5, upper bound |A|
Let A˜(ν) = argmin
{∑
ω ν(ω)uS(ω, a) : a ∈ A
∗(ν)
}
be the set of optimal actions of the
receiver at ν which are worse for the sender.
Claim A.3. For any action a, the set of ν’s such that a ∈ A˜(ν) is convex.
Proof.Observe first that the set of ν’s such that a ∈ A∗(ν) is defined by linear inequalities, i.e.
the optimality of a, therefore is convex. Consider now a ∈ A˜(ν1) ∩ A˜(ν2) and let us show that
a ∈ A˜(tν1 + (1 − t)ν2) for t ∈ (0, 1). We have a ∈ A
∗(ν1) ∩ A
∗(ν2) and by the remark above,
a ∈ A∗(tν1 + (1− t)ν2). Take b ∈ A
∗(tν1 + (1− t)ν2). We thus have
∑
ω
(tν1(ω) + (1− t)ν2(ω))uR(ω, a) =
∑
ω
(tν1(ω) + (1− t)ν2(ω))uR(ω, b).
Since a ∈ A∗(ν1) ∩A
∗(ν2),
∑
ω
ν1(ω)uR(ω, a) ≥
∑
ω
ν1(ω)uR(ω, b),
∑
ω
ν2(ω)uR(ω, a) ≥
∑
ω
ν2(ω)uR(ω, b).
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Combined together, we get b ∈ A∗(ν1) ∩A
∗(ν2). Since a ∈ A˜(ν1) ∩ A˜(ν2),
∑
ω
ν1(ω)uR(ω, a) ≤
∑
ω
ν1(ω)uR(ω, b),
∑
ω
ν2(ω)uS(ω, a) ≤
∑
ω
ν2(ω)uS(ω, b).
Taking the convex combination of these two inequalities proves the claim. 
Consider a feasible splitting (λm, µm) such that
∑
m λmνm = µ and
∑
m λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ)−
C. For each action a, define M(a) =
{
m : A˜(νm) = {a}
}
. Denote λ˜a =
∑
m∈M(a) λm and
ν˜a =
∑
m∈M(a)
λm
λ˜a
νm.
We have:
µ =
∑
m
λmνm
=
∑
a
λ˜a
∑
m∈M(a)
λm
λ˜a
νm
=
∑
a
λ˜aν˜a.
This defines a splitting of µ with |A| elements. We argue that the payoff is the same as the
initial splitting. Let us calculate the expected payoff. From the previous claim, for each action
a, a ∈ A˜(ν˜a). We thus have:
∑
m
λmu
∗
S(νm) =
∑
a
λ˜a
∑
m∈M(a)
λm
λ˜a
∑
ω
νm(ω)u
∗
S(ω, a)
=
∑
a
λ˜a
∑
ω
ν˜a(ω)u
∗
S(ω, a)
=
∑
a
λ˜au
∗
S(ν˜a).
To conclude the proof, we check that the information constraint is satisfied. This follows from
the concavity of entropy. Indeed,
H(ν˜a) ≥
∑
m∈M(a)
λm
λ˜a
H(νm)
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and thus, ∑
a
λ˜aH(ν˜a) ≥
∑
m
λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ)− C.

A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1, point 1, the upper bound
1. For each pair of integers k, n, U∗S(µn, Qk) ≤ V (µ,
k
nC(Q)).
Proof.Let us fix a strategy σ of the sender. This induces a probability distribution Pσ of sequences
in Ωn×Xk×Y k, the associated random sequences are denoted (ωn,xk,yk). Let t be a uniformly
distributed random variable over {1, . . . , n}, independent from (ωn,xk,yk) and denote m =
(yk, t) taking values in M = Y k × {1, . . . , n}.
We denote P˜
(
ω,m) the joint probability distribution of (ω,m) defined by:
P˜
(
ω,m) =P˜
(
ω = ω, (yk, t) = m
)
=P˜(t = t) · P˜
(
ω = ω,yk = yk
∣∣t = t)
=
1
n
· Pσ
(
ωt = ω,y
k = yk
)
.
Note that the marginal distribution of P˜
(
ω,m) on Ω is equal to the prior µ:
P˜
(
ω) =
∑
t,yk
P˜
(
ω = ω,yk = yk, t = t
)
=
∑
t,yk
1
n
· Pσ
(
ωt = ω,y
k = yk
)
=
∑n
t=1
1
n
· Pσ
(
ωt = ω
)
=Pσ
(
ω
)
·
∑n
t=1
1
n
= µ(ω).
Fix now a strategy τ of the receiver τ : Y k → An and define τ˜ : M → A where τ˜(m) = τ˜(yk, t) =
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τt(y
k), the t-th coordinate of τ(yk). The expected average payoff of player i = R,S writes:
Eσ,τ
[
u¯i
]
=
∑
ωn,xk,yk
Pσ(ω
n, xk, yk)
[
1
n
∑n
t=1
ui
(
ωt, τt(y
k)
)]
(5)
=
∑n
t=1
∑
ωt,xk,yk
1
n
· Pσ(ωt, x
k, yk) · ui
(
ωt, τt(y
k)
)
(6)
=
∑n
t=1
∑
ωt,yk
1
n
· Pσ(ωt, y
k) · ui
(
ωt, τt(y
k)
)
(7)
=
∑
ω,yk ,t
P˜(ω, yk, t) · ui
(
ω, τ˜ (yk, t)
)
(8)
=
∑
ω,m
P˜(ω,m) · ui
(
ω, τ˜(m)
)
. (9)
Equation =(6) implies Equation (7) by summing over xk which does not enter the payoff func-
tion. All other steps are reorderings and change of variables.
A strategy τ is a best-reply to σ if and only if:
τ(yk) ∈ arg max
an∈An
∑
ωn,xk,yk
µ(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Q(yk|xk)u¯R(ω
n, an)
⇐⇒ τ˜ (m) ∈ argmax
a∈A
∑
ω,m
P˜(ω,m) · uR(ω, a)
⇐⇒ τ˜ (m) ∈ argmax
a∈A
∑
ω
ν˜σ(ω|m) · uR(ω, a)
⇐⇒ τ˜ (m) ∈ A∗
(
ν˜σ(·|m)
)
where ν˜σ(ω|m) = P˜(ω|m). We deduce for any strategy σ of the sender and any best-reply τ of
the sender, the expected average payoffs are those induced by the splitting:
µ(ω) =
∑
m
P˜(m)ν˜σ(ω|m).
Now, we bound the mutual information of this splitting. Throughout the proof, we will abuse
our notations in a way that is common in information theory (see Cover and Thomas (2006)).
When x is a random variable with distribution p(x), we write H(x) for H(p), when (x,y) is a
pair of random variables with joint distribution p(x, y), we write H(y|x) for
∑
x p(x)H(p(·|x)).
Last, we will write I(x;y) without explicit reference to the joint distribution.
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For any strategy σ, we have:
0 ≤ I(xk;yk)− I(ωn;yk) (10)
=
∑k
t=1
H(yt|y
t−1)−
∑k
t=1
H(yt|x
k,yt−1)−
∑n
t=1
H(ωt|ω
t−1) +
∑n
t=1
H(ωt|y
k,ωt−1)
(11)
≤
∑k
t=1
H(yt)−
∑k
t=1
H(yt|xt)− n ·H(ω) +
∑n
t=1
H(ωt|y
k) (12)
=
∑k
t=1
I(xt;yt)− n ·H(ω) + n ·
∑n
t=1
P(t = t) ·H(ω|yk, t = t) (13)
≤ k ·max
P(x)
I(x;y)− n ·H(ω) + n ·H(ω|yk, t) (14)
= k ·max
P(x)
I(x;y)− n ·H(ω) + n ·H(ω|m) (15)
= k ·max
P(x)
I(x;y)− n · I(ω;m). (16)
- Equation (10) holds since the triple (ωn,xk,yk) has the Markov chain property; that is, its
join distribution writes µ(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Q(yk|xk). This implies I(xk;yk) ≥ I(ωn;yk), that is xk
is more informative that ωn about yk (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 2.8.1, p. 34).
- Equation (11) comes from the chain rule of entropy H(yk) =
∑k
t=1H(yt|y
t−1).
- Equation (12) follows since the channel is memoryless H(yt|x
k,yt−1) = H(yt|xt), the sequence
of states is i.i.d. H(ωt|ω
t−1) = H(ωt), and conditioning reduces entropy H(ωt|y
k,ωt−1) ≤
H(ωt|y
k).
- Equation (13) is a simple rewriting with the introduction of the uniform random variable
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
- Equation (14) comes from taking the maximum over the marginal distribution P(x).
- Equation (15) comes from the change of variable m = (yk, t).
Then, Equation (16) is equivalent to:
k ·max
P(x)
I(x;y)− n · I(ω;m) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ H(ω|m) ≥ H(ω)−
k
n
·max
P(x)
I(x;y)
⇐⇒
∑
m
λmH(µm) ≥ H(µ)−
k
n
· C(Q).
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Therefore, for any strategy σ and all n, k, we have:
min
τ∈BR(σ)
∑
ωn,xk,yk
µ(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Q(yk|xk)u¯S(ω
n, τ(yk))
= min
τ˜∈BR(σ)
∑
ω,m
P˜(ω,m) · uS
(
ω, τ˜(m)
)
=
∑
m
P˜(m) min
τ˜(m)∈A∗(ν˜σ(·|m))
∑
ω
ν˜σ(·|m) · uS
(
ω, τ˜(m)
)
=
∑
m
P˜(m) · u∗S
(
ν˜σ(·|m)
)
≤ sup
σ
{∑
m
P˜(m) · u∗S
(
ν˜σ(·|m)
)
s.t.
∑
m
P˜(m) · ν˜σ(·|m) = µ,
and
∑
m
P˜(m) ·H
(
ν˜σ(·|m)
)
≥ H(µ)−
k
n
· C(Q)
}
=sup
{∑
m
λm · u
∗
S
(
νm
)
s.t.
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
and
∑
m
λmH
(
νm
)
≥ H(µ)−
k
n
· C(Q)
}
= V (µ,
k
n
C(Q)).
This proves that for all n and k we have:
U∗S(µn, Qk) = sup
σ
min
τ∈BR(σ)
∑
ωn,xk,yk
µ(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Q(yk|xk)u¯S(ω
n, τ(yk))
≤V (µ,
k
n
C(Q))
as desired. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1, point 2, the limit value
2. For each r ∈ [0,+∞] and each pair of sequences (kj , nj)j∈N such that lim
j→∞
max(nj, kj) =∞
and lim
j→∞
kj
nj
= r, we have limj→∞U
∗
S(µ
nj , Qkj ) = V
(
µ, rC(Q)
)
.
For this proof we will consider the case r finite, nj → ∞, kj → ∞,
kj
nj
→ r. The proof for
the case where nj →∞, kj →∞,
kj
nj
→∞ is a consequence by considering r finite large enough
such that rC(Q) > H(µ). For the cases where either nj or kj is bounded, see Section 3.1.2. In
the rest of the proof, we will consider pairs of integers (k, n) which are generic terms of such a
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sequence (kj , nj)j∈N and omit the index j for simplicity of notations.
A.4.1 Zero capacity.
First, we investigate the case C(Q) = 0.
Lemma A.4. If the channel capacity is equal to zero maxp(x) I(x;y) = 0, then for all k, n, we
have:
U∗S(µ
n, Qk) = V (µ,
k
n
C(Q)) = u∗S(µ).
Proof. [Lemma A.4] Let (x,y) be a pair of random variables such that the conditional probability
of {y = y} given {x = x} is Q(y|x). If the capacity of the channel is 0, then I(x;y) =
H(y) − H(y|x) = 0 which implies that x and y are independent: no information can be sent
through the channel. This implies that for any splitting which satisfies the information constraint,
the random variables ω and m are independent, and for all m ∈M we have νm = µ. Hence:
V (µ,
k
n
C(Q)) = u∗S(µ).
Moreover, for any strategy σ, the sequence of messages yk of the receiver is independent from
the sequence of states ωn. It follows that:
U∗S(µ
n, Qk) = sup
σ
min
τ∈BR(σ)
∑
ωn,xk,yk
µn(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Qk(yk)u¯S(ω
n, τ(yk))
= min
τ∈BR(σ)
∑
ωn,yk
µn(ωn)Qk(yk)
[
1
n
∑n
t=1
uS(ωt, τt(y
k))
]
=
1
n
∑n
t=1
min
at∈A∗(µ)
∑
ωt
µ(ωt)uS(ωt, at)
= min
a∈A∗(µ)
∑
ω
µ(ω)uS(ω, a) = u
∗
S(µ),
which concludes the proof. 
A.4.2 Positive channel capacity.
We assume from now on C(Q) > 0. The goal is to take a splitting of the prior which
satisfies the information constraint and to show that the associated payoff can be approximately
achieved by strategy σ of the sender and a best-reply τ ∈ BR(σ) of the receiver. The next lemma
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states that we can focus on splittings such that the information constraint is satisfied with strict
inequality and where the action of the receiver is unique for each posterior. Concretely, we prove
that such splittings are dense in the set of feasible splittings. Recall that we denote A˜(ν) the set
of worst optimal actions when the belief is ν ∈ ∆(Ω):
A˜(ν) = argmin
{∑
ω
ν(ω)uS(ω, a) : a ∈ A
∗(ν)
}
.
Consider the following program:
V̂ (µ,
k
n
C(Q)) = sup
{∑
m
λmu
∗
S(νm)
s.t.
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
and H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(νm) <
k
n
C(Q)
and ∀m, A˜(νm) is a singleton
}
.
Lemma A.5. For all integers (k, n), µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and Q such that C(Q) > 0 we have:
V (µ,
k
n
C(Q)) = V̂ (µ,
k
n
C(Q)). (17)
The proof of Lemma A.5 is postponed to Section A.4.3. Then, the proof of our main result
continues with two lemmas. In Lemma A.8, we approximate the payoff yielded by any strategy.
We will see the relevance of the number of stages where the actual belief of the receiver is close
to the desired target, and the importance of this number being large. Next, in Lemma A.9 we
prove that there is a strategy for which this holds. We use there known results from information
theory for defining the coding scheme which gives the strategy of the sender. Then, we prove
that this strategy actually controls the Bayesian beliefs of the receiver.
Given a strategy σ of the sender, we denote the induced expected payoff as follows:
ÛS,σ(µ
n, Qk) = min
τ∈BR(σ)
∑
ωn,xk,yk
µ(ωn)σ(xk|ωn)Q(yk|xk)u¯S(ω
n, τ(yk)),
= min
τ∈BR(σ)
E
ωn,xk,yk
[
u¯S(ω
n, τ(yk))
]
.
Let νσ
t,yk
∈ ∆(Ω) denote the posterior belief on ωt conditional on the sequence y
k. That is,
νσt,yk(ω) = Pσ
(
ωt = ω | y
k
)
.
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For ν1, ν2 ∈ ∆(Ω), the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is,
D(ν1‖ν2) =
∑
ω
ν1(ω) log
ν1(ω)
ν2(ω)
.
We will introduce several positive parameters α, γ, δ, to be thought of as small.
Notation A.6. For a sequence (mn, yk) and α > 0, denote
Tα(m
n, yk) =
{
t ∈ {1, . . . , n} : D(νσt,yk‖νmt) ≤
α2
2 ln 2
}
.
This is the set of indices t = 1, . . . , n such that the posterior belief νσ
t,yk
about ωt is close to the
theoretical belief νmt . Intuitively, this is the set of indices where the message mt is approximately
transmitted. Now, we define an event Bα,γ,δ ⊆ M
n × Y k such that for every (mn, yk) ∈ Bα,γ,δ,
1
n
∑n
t=1 u
∗
S(ν
σ
t,yk
) is close to
∑
m λmu
∗
S(νm).
Notation A.7. For a sequence (mn, yk) and m ∈M , denote
freqm(m
n, yk) =
1
n
∣∣∣{t = 1, . . . , n : mt = m}∣∣∣
the empirical frequency of message m in the sequence mn. For α, γ, δ > 0, let
Bα,γ,δ =
{
(mn, yk) :
|Tα(m
n, yk)|
n
≥ 1− γ and
∑
m
|λm − freqm(m
n, yk)| ≤ δ
}
Lemma A.8.
∣∣∣∣ÛS,σ(µn, Qk)− V̂ (µ, rC(Q))∣∣∣∣ ≤ (α+ 2γ + δ)‖u‖ + (1− Pσ(Bα,γ,δ))‖u‖.
The proof of Lemma A.8 is given in Section A.4.4. We see from this inequality that estimating
the probability of the setBα,γ,δ is crucial and that we would like the probability of the complement
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) to be small.
Last, Lemma A.9 corresponds to the actual construction of the strategy.
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Lemma A.9. Assume that the splitting (λm, νm)m satisfies the three conditions:
∑
m
λmνm = µ, (18)
H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(µm) < rC(Q), (19)
∀m, A˜(νm) is a singleton, (20)
then ∀ε > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃δ¯, ∀δ ≤ δ¯, ∃n¯, ∀n ≥ n¯, ∃σ, such that Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε.
The proof of Lemma A.9 is in Appendix A.4.5. The idea is that, since the information
constraint is satisfied i.e. I(ω;m) < rC(Q), there is enough capacity to transmit m over the
channel. More precisely, we construct a strategy such that the set Bα,γ,δ has probability close
to 1. This way, for most sequences (ωn,mn, xk, yk), the receiver gets the right message in most
stages. That is, at most stages the receiver plays the action corresponding to the message.
We may now conclude the main proof. We combine the inequality of Lemma A.8 with the
bound Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε of Lemma A.9. We choose the parameters α, γ, η, δ small and then n large
in order to obtain the following:
Proposition A.10. For all r > 0 and ε > 0, there exists integers N(ε),K(ε) such that for all
n ≥ N(ε), k ≥ K(ε) and | kn − r| ≤ ε, there exists a strategy σ such that:∣∣∣∣ÛS,σ(µn, Qk)− V̂ (µ, rC(Q))∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε. (21)
With Lemma A.5, this ends the proof of point 2 of Theorem 3.1. 
A.4.3 Proof of Lemma A.5
Remark A.11. From Corollary 3.5, we know that we can restrict the number of messages, i.e.
the number of posteriors to K = min{|A|, |Ω|+1}. Therefore, from now on a splitting (λm, νm)m
will be understood to be a composed of λ = (λ1, . . . , λK) ∈ ∆({1, . . . ,K}) and (νm)m ∈ (∆(Ω))
K .
The set of splittings of µ is thus a convex and compact subset of ∆({1, . . . ,K})×(∆(Ω))K which
itself is a compact and convex set in some finite dimension space. All statements below about
closed or open sets of splittings relate to the topology induced by the Euclidean topology on this
finite dimension space.
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We consider the following sets:
S1 =
{
(λm, νm)m, s.t.
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
and
∑
m
λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ)−
k
n
C(Q)
}
,
S2 =
{
(λm, νm)m, s.t.
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
and ∀m, A˜(νm) is a singleton
}
,
S3 =
{
(λm, νm)m, s.t.
∑
m
λmνm = µ,
and
∑
m
λmH(νm) > H(µ)−
k
n
C(Q)
}
.
We will prove that the set S2 ∩ S3 is dense in S1, which will imply that Equation (17) is
satisfied. We first argue that A˜(ν) is a singleton for an open and dense set of posteriors ν.
Definition A.12. Two actions a and b are equivalent a ∼i b for player i = S,R, if for all ω ∈ Ω,
ui(ω, a) = ui(ω, b).
We say that two actions a and b are completely equivalent if they are equivalent for both
players. Without loss of generality, we assume that no two actions are completely equivalent.
Otherwise, we can merge them into one single action and work on the reduced problem.
Denote Fi ⊆ ∆(Ω) the set of beliefs for which player i ∈ {S,R} is indifferent between two
actions which are not equivalent:
Fi =
{
ν ∈ ∆(Ω) : ∃a, b, a ≁i b,
∑
ω
ν(ω)ui(ω, a) =
∑
ω
ν(ω)ui(ω, b)
}
.
Let F c = ∆(Ω) \
(
FR ∪ FS
)
be the set of beliefs where at least one player is not indifferent
between any two actions.
Claim A.13. The set F c is open and dense in ∆(Ω) and for each ν ∈ F c, A˜(ν) is a singleton.
Proof. [Claim A.13] For each i and each pair of actions a, b with a ≁i b, the set,
Fi(a, b) =
{
ν ∈ ∆(Ω) :
∑
ω
ν(ω)ui(ω, a) =
∑
ω
ν(ω)ui(ω, b)
}
is a closed hyperplane of dimension dim(Fi(a, b)) ≤ |Ω| − 2. Thus, FR and FS are closed
and FR ∪ FS is included in a finite union of hyperplanes of dimension at most |Ω| − 2. The
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complementary set is thus open and dense in ∆(Ω).
Then, if A˜(ν) contains two distinct actions a 6= b, both players are indifferent between a and
b at ν. Thus, if ν ∈ F c, A˜(ν) is a singleton. 
It follows that S2 is open and dense in S1.
Claim A.14. If the channel capacity is strictly positive C(Q) > 0, the set S3 is nonempty, open
and dense in S1.
Proof. [Claim A.14] Take a feasible splitting (λm, νm)m in S1:
∑
m
λmH(νm) ≥ H(µ)−
k
n
C(Q).
For ε > 0, consider the perturbed splitting (λm, (1−ε)νm+εµ)m. From concavity of the entropy,
∑
m
λmH((1− ε)νm + εµ) ≥ (1− ε)
∑
m
λmH(νm) + εH(µ),
≥ H(µ)−
k
n
C(Q) + ε
k
n
C(Q)
> H(µ)−
k
n
C(Q);
thus, the information constraint is satisfied with strict inequality for ε > 0. It follows that S3 is
nonempty and dense in S1. By continuity of the entropy, S3 is open in S1. 
Since S2 and S3 are open and dense, S2 ∩ S3 is also open and dense in S1. We can conclude
that V (µ, knC(Q)) = V̂ (µ,
k
nC(Q)) as desired. This follows from the fact that the function
u∗S(ν) = min
a∈A∗(ν)
∑
ω
ν(ω)uS(ω, a)
is lower-semi continuous and the supremum of an l.s.c. function over a dense set is the supremum
over the full set.
It should be noticed that this is the only argument in the proof where the assumption that
the receiver chooses the worst action for the sender, has a bite. When the receiver chooses the
best action for the sender, we should consider u∗∗S (ν) = maxa∈A∗(ν)
∑
ω ν(ω)uS(ω, a) which is
upper-semi continuous. In that case, the supremum over the dense set S2 ∩ S3 might be less
than the supremum over S1. However, this can only happen when the information constraint
is binding at optimum and all posteriors in the optimal splitting are points of indifference for
the receiver. This case is nongeneric in our class of persuasion problems: a slight change of the
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payoff function of the receiver would perturb the points of indifference and thus the points of
discontinuity of u∗ and u∗∗. 
A.4.4 Proof of Lemma A.8
The strategy σ induces a joint probability distribution Pσ over Ω
n ×Mn ×Xk × Y k:
Pσ
(
ωn,mn, xk, yk) =
∏n
t=1
µ(ωt)× σ(m
n, xk|ωn)×
∏n
t=1
Q(yt|xt).
For each sequence yk of messages and for each t, the receiver chooses an optimal action
at ∈ A
∗(νσ
t,yk
). In the worst case (for the sender), this action at belongs to A˜(ν
σ
t,yk
). It follows
that:
Claim A.15.
ÛS,σ(µ
n, Qk) =
∑
mn,yk
Pσ(m
n, yk)
1
n
∑n
t=1
u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk).
Remark A.16. Since the set of posteriors ν such that A˜(ν) is a singleton is open, there exists
α0 > 0 such that for all m:
D(ν‖νm) ≤ α0 ⇒ A˜(ν) = A˜(νm).
Whenever A˜(ν) is a singleton, denote A˜(ν) = {a˜(ν)} the unique (worst) optimal action.
From now on, we assume that α ∈ (0, α0). With the remark above, this implies that for each
t ∈ Tα(m
n, yk), the action chosen by the receiver for problem t is τt(m
n, yk) = a˜(νmt). So
precisely, Tα(m
n, yk) is the set of indices t such that the receiver plays the action a˜(νmt) which
corresponds to the message mt. In this sense, this is the set of indices for which the information
transmission is successful.
Lemma A.17. For each (mn, yk) ∈ Bα,γ,δ,
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑n
t=1
u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)−
∑
m
λmu
∗
S(νm)
∣∣∣ ≤ (α+ 2γ + δ)‖u‖,
where ‖u‖ = maxω,a |uS(ω, a)| is the largest absolute value of payoffs for the sender.
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Proof. Denote u∗ =
∑
m λmu
∗
S(νm). We have:
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑n
t=1
u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t/∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗)
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗)
∣∣∣+ γ‖U‖
Then:
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗
S(νmt))
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(νmt)− u
∗)
∣∣∣
Since α ≤ α0, for each t ∈ Tα(m
n, yk), a˜(νσ
t,yk
) = a˜(νmt). Therefore, for t ∈ Tα(m
n, yk)
∣∣∣u∗S(νσt,yk)− u∗S(νmt)∣∣∣ ≤∑ω |νσt,yk(ω)− νmt(ω)| · |uS(ω, a)| ≤ ‖νσt,yk − νmt‖ · ‖u‖ ≤ α‖u‖,
where the latter inequality comes from Pinsker’s inequality9: ‖ν1 − ν2‖ ≤
√
2 ln 2D(ν1‖ν2) and
the definition of Tα(m
n, yk). It follows:
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(ν
σ
t,yk)− u
∗)
∣∣∣ ≤ α‖u‖+ ∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(νmt)− u
∗)
∣∣∣
Now from |Tα(m
n,yk)|
n ≥ 1− γ, we have:
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
t∈Tα(mn,yk)
(u∗S(νmt)− u
∗)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ 1
n
∑n
t=1
(u∗S(νmt)− u
∗)
∣∣∣+ γ‖u‖.
Then:
∣∣∣ 1
n
∑n
t=1
(u∗S(νmt)− u
∗)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑
m
(freqm(m
n, yk)− λm)u
∗
S(νm)
∣∣∣
≤
∑
m
∣∣∣freqm(mn, yk)− λm∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣u∗S(νm)∣∣∣
≤ ‖u‖δ.
Collecting all inequalities together yields the desired conclusion. 
9Cover and Thomas, 2006, Lemma 11.6.1, p. 370.
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A.4.5 Proof of Lemma A.9
By hypothesis, the splitting (λm, νm)m satisfies the three conditions:
∑
m
λmνm = µ, (22)
H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(µm) < rC(Q), (23)
∀m, A˜(νm) is a singleton. (24)
Let M = {1, . . . , |M |} be the set of messages associated with this splitting.
Part 1. Coding scheme. We turn now to the actual construction. We use standard information
theoretic techniques for Channel Coding (Gamal and Kim, 2011, Chap. 3.1, p. 38) and Lossy
Source Coding (Gamal and Kim, 2011, Chap. 3.6, p. 56). Using information theoretic language,
the sender is viewed as an encoder who encrypts his intended mn messages in sequences of inputs
xk. The messages mn are immaterial and can be seen as a pure mental construct of the sender.
The encoding is such that a decoder who reads the sequence yk, is able to determine the correct
mn with high probability. This is described as follows.
For δ > 0, we define the set of typical sequences Aδ as follows:
Aδ =
{
(ωn,mn, xk, yk), s.t.
∑
ω,m
∣∣∣λmµm(ω)− freq ω,m(ωn,mn)∣∣∣ ≤ δ, (25)
and
∑
x,y
∣∣∣P(x)×Q(y|x)− freq x,y(xk, yk)∣∣∣ ≤ δ}. (26)
A pair of sequences (ωn,mn) which satisfies Equation (25) will be called jointly typical. Similarly,
pair of sequences (xk, yk) which satisfies Equation (26) will be called jointly typical. With a
slight abuse of notation, we will write (ωn,mn) ∈ Aδ or (x
k, yk) ∈ Aδ to indicate jointly typical
sequences.
Since condition (23) is satisfied with strict inequality, there exists a small parameter η > 0
and a “rate” R ≥ 0, such that:
R =H(µ)−
∑
m
λmH(µm) + η, (27)
R ≤rC(Q)− η. (28)
Moreover, we can assume that nR is an integer for n large enough.
• Random codebook. A codebook is a family b of |J | = 2nR sequences mn(j) and xk(j) indexed
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by j ∈ J . A random codebook is the draw of a codebook from the marginal i.i.d. probability
distributions (λm)
⊗n and P(x)⊗n. The selected codebook is known by the encoder and the
decoder.
• Encoding function. The encoder observes the sequence of states ωn ∈ Ωn. It finds an index
j ∈ J such that the sequences (ωn,mn(j)) ∈ Aδ are jointly typical, i.e. satisfy Equation
(25). The encoder sends the sequence xk(j) corresponding to the index j ∈ J .
• Decoding function. The decoder observes the sequence of channel output yk ∈ Y k. It finds
an index jˆ ∈ J such that the sequences
(
xk(jˆ), yk
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical, i.e. satisfy
Equation (26). The decoder decodes the sequence mn(jˆ).
• Error Event. We introduce the indicator of error Eδ ∈ {0, 1} defined as follows:
Eδ =
{
0 if j = jˆ and
(
ωn,mn, xk, yk
)
∈ Aδ,
1 if j 6= jˆ or
(
ωn,mn, xk, yk
)
/∈ Aδ.
(29)
An error Eδ = 1 occurs in the coding process if: 1) the indices j ∈ J and jˆ ∈ J are not
equal or 2) the sequences of symbols
(
ωn,mn, xk, yk
)
/∈ Aδ, i.e. are not jointly typical.
An important result in information theory is that the expected probability of error over the
random codebook is small.
Expected error probability. For all ε2 > 0, for all η > 0, there exists a δ¯ > 0, for all δ ≤ δ¯
there exists n¯, k¯ such that for all n ≥ n¯, k ≥ k¯ and | kn − r| ≤ ε2, the expected probability of the
following error events are bounded by ε2:
E
[
Pb
(
∀j ∈ J,
(
ωn,mn(j)
)
/∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (30)
E
[
Pb
(
∃j′ 6= j, s.t.
(
yk, xk(j′)
)
∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2. (31)
- Equation (30) comes from Equation (27) and the Covering Lemma A.18, (Gamal and Kim,
2011, Lemma 3.3, p. 62).
- Equation (31) comes from Equation (28) and the Packing Lemma A.19, (Gamal and Kim, 2011,
Lemma 3.1, p. 46).
If the expected probability of error is small over the codebooks, then it has to be small for
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at least one codebook. Following a standard analysis of the error probability, (Gamal and Kim,
2011, pp. 42–43, 60–61), Equations (30), (31) imply that:
∀ε2 > 0, ∀η > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ ≤ δ¯, ∃n¯, k¯, ∀n ≥ n¯,∀k ≥ k¯, |
k
n
− r| ≤ ε2, ∃b
⋆, s.t. Pb⋆
(
Eδ = 1
)
≤ ε2.
(32)
The strategy σ of the sender consists in using this codebook b⋆ in order to find the sequence
mn(j) which is jointly typical with ωn, and in sending the sequence xk(j). By construction, this
satisfies Equation (32), i.e. it has a low probability of error.
Part 2. Control of the Beliefs. The previous construction has the property that the decoder who
uses the decoding schemes, makes an error with small probability. Now, the receiver needs not
use the decoding scheme. Actually, the receiver calculates the posterior belief on the sequence
of states ωn, given yk. Our contribution is to show that those beliefs are close to the prescribed
beliefs νm at most stages. We have the following chain of inequalities:
Eσ
[
1
n
∑n
t=1
D
(
νσt,yk
∥∥∥νmt) ∣∣∣Eδ = 0
]
=
∑
mn,yk
Pσ(m
n, yk|Eδ = 0) ·
1
n
∑n
t=1
D
(
νσt,yk
∥∥∥νmt) (33)
=
1
n
∑
(ωn,mn,yk)∈Aδ
Pσ(ω
n,mn, yk|Eδ = 0) · log2
1∏n
t=1 νmt(ωt)
−
1
n
∑n
t=1
H(ωt|y
k, Eδ = 0)
(34)
≤
1
n
∑
(ωn,mn,yk)∈Aδ
Pσ(ω
n,mn, yk|Eδ = 0) · log2
1∏n
t=1 νmt(ωt)
−
1
n
∑n
t=1
H(ωt|m
n,yk, Eδ = 0)
(35)
≤
1
n
∑
(ωn,mn,yk)∈Aδ
Pσ(ω
n,mn, yk|Eδ = 0) · n ·
(
H(ω|m) + δ
)
−
1
n
H(ωn|mn,yk, Eδ = 0)
(36)
≤
1
n
I(ωn;mn,yk|Eδ = 0)− I(ω;m) + δ +
1
n
+ log2 |Ω| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
(37)
≤
1
n
I(ωn;mn|Eδ = 0)− I(ω;m) + δ +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |Ω| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
(38)
≤η + δ +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |Ω| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
. (39)
- Equation (33) comes from the definition of the expected K-L divergence.
- Equation (34) comes from the conditioning by Eδ = 0, since the support of Pσ(ω
n,mn, yk|Eδ =
0) is included in Aδ.
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- Equation (35) comes from the property of the entropy H(ωt|m
n,yk, Eδ = 0) ≤ H(ωt|y
k, Eδ =
0).
- Equation (36) comes from the property of typical sequences (ωn,mn) ∈ Aδ, stated in Lemma
A.20 and in Gamal and Kim (2011, Property 1, pp. 26), and the chain rule for entropy:
H(ωn|mn,yk, Eδ = 0) ≤
∑n
t=1
H(ωt|m
n,yk, Eδ = 0).
- Equation (37) comes from Lemma A.22 (see section A.5), which implies
1
n
H(ωn|Eδ = 0)−
1
n
H(ωn) +
1
n
+ log2 |Ω| · Pσ(Eδ = 1) ≥ 0.
Adding this expression to Equation (36) yields Equation (37).
- Equation (38) comes from Lemma A.22 (see section A.5) which implies that
I(ωn;yk|mn, Eδ = 0) ≤ I(ω
n;yk|mn)+1+n · log2 |Ω| ·Pσ(Eδ = 1) = 1+n · log2 |Ω| ·Pσ(Eδ = 1),
where I(ωn;yk|mn) = 0, from the Markov chain property of the triple (ωn,mn,yk).
- Equation (39) comes from the cardinality of the codebook10:
I(ωn;mn|Eδ = 0) ≤ H(m
n) ≤ log2 |J | = n · R = n · (I(ω;m) + η).
Then, we have:
1− Pσ(Bα,γ,δ) := Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ)
=Pσ(Eδ = 1)Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 1) + Pσ(Eδ = 0)Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
≤Pσ(Eδ = 1) + Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
≤ε2 + Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0). (40)
10The last argument is inspired by Merhav and Shamai, 2007, Equation (23), for the problem of “Information
Rates Subject to State Masking”.
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Moreover:
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
=
∑
mn,yk
Pσ
(
(mn, yk) ∈ Bcα,γ,δ
∣∣∣Eδ = 0) (41)
=
∑
mn,yk
Pσ
(
(mn, yk) s.t.
|Tα(m
n, yk)|
n
< 1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(42)
=Pσ
(
#
n
{
t, s.t. D
(
νσt,yk
∥∥∥∥νmt) ≤ α22 ln 2
}
< 1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(43)
=Pσ
(
#
n
{
t, s.t. D
(
νσt,yk
∥∥∥∥νmt) > α22 ln 2
}
≥ γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(44)
≤
2 ln 2
α2γ
· Eσ
[
1
n
∑n
t=1
D
(
νσt,yk
∥∥∥∥νmt)
]
(45)
≤
2 ln 2
α2γ
·
(
η + δ +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |Ω| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
))
. (46)
- Equations (41) to (44) are simple reformulations.
- Equation (45) comes from a use of Markov’s inequality, detailed in Lemma A.21 (see section
A.5).
- Equation (46) comes from equation (39).
Combining equations (32), (40), and (46) we obtain the following statement:
∀ε3 > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃η¯, ∀η ≤ η¯, ∃δ¯, ∀δ ≤ δ¯, ∃n¯, k¯, ∀n ≥ n¯,∀k ≥ k¯, |
k
n − r| ≤ ε3, ∃σ,
such that:
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ 2 · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
+
2 ln 2
α2γ
·
(
η + δ +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |Ω| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
))
≤ ε3.
By choosing appropriately the “rate” R ≥ 0 in (27) and (28) such as to make η > 0 small, we
obtain the desired result:
∀ε > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃δ¯, ∀δ ≤ δ¯, ∃n¯, k¯, ∀n ≥ n¯,∀k ≥ k¯, |
k
n
− r| ≤ ε, ∃σ,
such that Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε. 
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A.5 Additional lemmas
The next three lemmas are standard results in information theory. They are recalled for the
convenience of the reader.
Lemma A.18. (Covering lemma: compression of information source, Lemma 3.3, p. 62 in
Gamal and Kim, 2011)
Consider a random sequence ωn with i.i.d. distribution P⊗n(ω) and a family of 2nR sequences(
mn(j)
)
j∈{1,...,2nR}
independently drawn from the i.i.d. distribution P⊗n(m). Assume that R =
I(ω;m) + η with η > 0.
For all ε > 0, there exists δ¯ > 0, such that for all δ ≤ δ¯, there exists n¯, such that for all
n ≥ n¯:
P
(
∀j ∈ J,
(
ωn,mn(j)
)
/∈ Aδ
)
≤ ε.
Lemma A.19. (Packing lemma: transmission over a noisy channel, Lemma 3.1, p. 46 Gamal
and Kim, 2011)
Consider a random sequence yk drawn with i.i.d. distribution P⊗k(y) and a family of 2kR
sequences
(
xk(j)
)
j∈{1,...,2kR}
independently drawn from the i.i.d. distribution P⊗k(x). Assume
that R = I(x;y)− η with η > 0.
For all ε > 0, there exists δ¯ > 0, such that for all δ ≤ δ¯, there exists k¯, such that for all
k ≥ k¯:
P
(
∃j ∈ J,
(
xk(j), yk
)
∈ Aδ
)
≤ ε.
Lemma A.20 (Typical sequences, Property 1, p. 26 in Gamal and Kim, 2011). The typical
sequences (ωn,mn) ∈ Aδ satisfy:
∀δ2 > 0, ∃δ¯2 > 0, ∀δ ≤ δ¯2, ∀n, ∀(ω
n,mn) ∈ Aδ,∣∣∣∣ 1n · log2 1∏nt=1 P(ωt|mt) −H(ω|m)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ2,
where δ¯2 = δ2 ·H(ω|m).
The next two lemmas are easy ancillary results that were used in the proofs and were omitted
in the previous section to ease the reading.
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Lemma A.21 (Markov’s inequality). For all ε1 > 0, ε2 > 0 we have:
Eσ
[
1
n
∑n
t=1
D
(
Pσ(ωt|y
n, Eδ = 0)
∥∥∥∥P(ωt|mt))
]
≤ ε0 (47)
=⇒Pmn,yn
(
#
n
{
t, s.t. D
(
Pσ(ωt|y
n, Eδ = 0)
∥∥∥∥P(ωt|mt)) > ε1} > ε2
)
≤
ε0
ε1 · ε2
. (48)
Proof. [Lemma A.21] We denote by Dt = D
(
Pσ(ωt|y
n, Eδ = 0)
∥∥P(ωt|mt)) and Dn = {Dt}t the
K-L divergence. We have that:
P
(
#
n
{
t, s.t. Dt > ε1
}
> ε2
)
=P
(
1
n
·
∑n
t=1
1
{
Dt > ε1
}
> ε2
)
(49)
≤
E
[
1
n ·
∑n
t=1 1
{
Dt > ε1
}]
ε2
(50)
=
1
n ·
∑n
t=1 E
[
1
{
Dt > ε1
}]
ε2
(51)
=
1
n ·
∑n
t=1 P
(
Dt > ε1
)
ε2
(52)
≤
1
n ·
∑n
t=1
E[Dt]
ε1
ε2
(53)
=
1
ε1 · ε2
· E
[
1
n
·
∑n
t=1
Dt
]
≤
ε0
ε1 · ε2
. (54)
- Equations (49), (51), (52), (54) are reformulations of probabilities and expectations.
- Equations (50), (53), come from Markov’s inequality P(X ≥ α) ≤ E[X]/α. 
Lemma A.22. Consider an i.i.d. random sequence ωn. For all ε > 0, there exists n¯ ∈ N such
that for all n ≥ n¯ we have:
H(ωn|Eδ = 0) ≥n ·
(
H(ω)− ε
)
. (55)
Proof. [Lemma A.22]
H(ωn|Eδ = 0) =
1
P(Eδ = 0)
·
(
H(ωn|Eδ = 1)− P(Eδ = 1) ·H(ω
n|Eδ = 1)
)
(56)
≥H(ωn|Eδ)− P(Eδ = 1) ·H(ω
n|Eδ = 1) (57)
≥H(ωn)−H(Eδ)− P(Eδ = 1) ·H(ω
n|Eδ = 1) (58)
≥H(ωn)− n · ε. (59)
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- Equation (56) comes from the definition of the conditional entropy.
- Equation (57) comes from the property P(Eδ = 0) ≤ 1.
- Equation (58) comes from the property H(ωn|Eδ) = H(ω
n, Eδ)−H(Eδ) ≥ H(ω
n)−H(Eδ).
- Equation (59) comes from the i.i.d. property of the state ω and the definition of the error
event Eδ = 1. Hence, for all ε, there exists a n¯ ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n¯ we have: H(P(Eδ =
1)) + P(Eδ = 1) · log2 |Ω| ≤ ε. 
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